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This paper presents a model of Rule of Law in which a continuum of agents
plays against the State for the appropriation of the economic assets of a stylised
economy. The model shows how each agent can either challenge the State or
acquiesce, with the latter having the choice of either protecting property rights
or abandoning the economy to anarchy. Players' payo®s are a®ected by strategic
complementarities, not only between State and agents but also among agents
themselves. As a consequence of this, a Coordination Failure is generated. The
solution of the game is given by two Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Introducing
idiosyncratic information and sequential play generates a unique equilibrium,
according to the global game approach. On the one hand, this model predicts
that high uncertainty and sunk costs in law enforcement have a negative e®ect,
pushing the economy towards a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. On the other
hand, the high value given to the economy's assets (embedded social norms) has
a positive in°uence, leading to a Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Keywords: Rule of Law, Coordination Failure, Global Games
JEL Classi¯cation: D81, C72, K42
¤I would like to thank Giovanni Dosi, Giorgio Fagiolo, Barbara G. Katz, Joel Owen, G¶ erard Roland
and Guido Tabellini for their very useful comments and suggestions. I also thank the participants of
the 2005 Annual EAEPE Conference, Bremen, for their very fruitful discussions. The usual disclaimer
applies. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily re°ect those of Sant'Anna School
of Advanced Studies or Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti.
yLEM, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna (Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies), Pisa, Italy, Pi-
azza dei Martiri della Libertµ a, 33 - 56127 Pisa, Italy. Phone: +39-050-883711 Fax +39-050-
883344 Email: brunor@sssup.it and Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti, Via Salasco 5, 20136 Milano,
http://www.frdb.org
11 Introduction
This paper focuses on an economy in which the Rule of Law is potentially weak, i.e.
in countries in the process of transition from planned to market economy, as well as
underdeveloped countries with weak property rights' institutions, and aims to answer
the following two questions: is it possible to avoid the trap of an anarchic state of
the economy, with low property law enforcement, strong power concentrated in the
hands of few rich oligarchs, no clear mechanism for enforcing checks and balances
between the three branches of power and no clear separation between legitimate and
illegitimate actions? Furthermore, what are the key explanations for lawlessness and
missing institutional change in those countries?
By applying a global game approach (Carlsson and van Damme (1993a); Carlsson
and van Damme (1993b); Morris and Shin (1998); Morris and Shin (2000a); Morris and
Shin (2000b)) this paper builds a simple model that tries to explain why some countries
are not able to enforce the Rule of Law, despite the fact that they are relatively
advanced in their transition/development. In a coordination game, a continuum of
agents plays against the State1. They have the incentive to break the Rule of Law
(for example in societies with weak social norms), and to refrain from cooperating
for its enforcement/protection2. The lack of foresight on other players actions and
strategic complementarities (the simultaneous action of many players a®ects players'
payo®s) generate multiple equilibria. Under some general `global game' conditions a
unique equilibrium can be reached. The society could be blocked in a Pareto non-
e±cient equilibrium, even in the case of an economy being relatively strong as far as
its institutions are concerned.
For example, this model applies to the transition period, considered a `window of
opportunity', where pro-development reforms can be more easily implemented. How-
ever, enforcing the Rule of Law in countries experiencing a transformation from a
centralised to a democratic society has proven to be extremely di±cult3. In other
words, it is not clear how to enforce a Rule of Law mechanism in an e®ective way when
1Throughout the paper State and Government will be used interchangeably.
2Mauro (1995) wrote a seminal article on the corruption-growth relationship. This paper is about
property right protection and national governance, without a speci¯c focus on growth.
3The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been working on this issue for over
a decade. A joint EBRD-World Bank project has been conducted with the aim of collecting and
analysing data and related information on the \Business Environment and Enterprises Performance
surveys" (BEEPs) in 27 transition economies. One of the questions the study is trying to answer is the
reason behind the weak enforcement of property rights and, consequently, the feeble penetration and
respect of the \rule of the game" in the legal, judicial or court systems of ex-centralised economies.
See Transition Report (2005).
2an important part of the society does not believe in its value.
In section 2 this paper will ¯rst look at the previous studies on the impossibility
of enforcing the respect of the Rule of Law in transition and developing countries. This
has become an important issue in recent literature on the topic, (Roland (2000); Dixit
(2004); Rigobon and Rodrik (2005)). Indeed, theoretical and empirical papers have
dealt with the Rule of Law enforcement activity from di®erent perspectives and with
multidisciplinary approach incorporating political science, political economy and `law
& economics'. Some scholars argue that the Rule of Law enforcement is a \second
order phenomenon": as soon as the property rights are su±ciently widespread (despite
the fact that they are not yet protected), citizens and economic agents (¯rms, corpo-
rations, etc) will form political constituencies acting as social pressure groups that will
lobby politicians to adopt policies to protect the rule of law and those same property
rights (e.g. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995)). Looking at Russia in the aftermath of
mass privatisation programmes, it is noticeable that law enforcement was not e®ective.
Even after a few years there was no clear sign of progress towards its actual implemen-
tation. The Russian example is not isolated4. The reasons for this riddle are not fully
understood5 and such an interest in the literature might lie in the belief that `making
certain that the laws are obeyed' is indeed a®ected by coordination failure and therefore
the social optimum can be reached only under speci¯c circumstances and institutional
contexts.
Section 3 will unfold the logic of the model of an economy where strategic com-
plementarities do not allow agents to internalise the e®ect of other agents' actions. In
numerous economic and social contexts (Ho® (2000); Cooper (1999)), this coordination
failure might be characterised by multiple equilibria outcomes. The non uniqueness
of the equilibrium does not allow for neat policy implications. Exploiting the global
game framework, the paper will rely on two key assumptions -imperfect information
(idiosyncratic noisy signals) and sequential play- in order to lead to a unique equilib-
rium.
Tentative and speci¯c policy implications are then discussed in the conclusions.
4The following quotation by Cooter (1996) captures the idea: "The Soviet Union exempli¯ed the
rule of State law, [...]. Since state law did not respond to morality, spontaneous support for law by
citizens was weak. Soviet citizens, who were accustomed to a low level of spontaneous support for
law by citizens, must have expected this tradition to continue after the Soviet government collapsed.
These expectations created a self-ful¯lling prophesy and caused the system to equilibrate with low
private support for state law, which in turn made state law ine®ective. The situation is the opposite
of the rule of law State [...]".
5A recent strand of the literature looks at the relationship between political institutions and re-
source abundance in developing or transition countries. See for example Robisnson, Torvik and Verdier
(2006) and Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2006).
32 Related Literature
2.1 Coordination Failure & Multiple Equilibria
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) investigated the importance of external economies in the
industrialisation process of depressed-underdeveloped areas. A simultaneous (coordi-
nated) investment into a variety of industries6 would allow the social value of invest-
ment to be higher than the sum of the private evaluation of each and every industry. In
other words, industries might fail to coordinate because they do not internalise crucial
pro-development forces. This could be avoided when a big push into many industries
is planned and implemented by a benevolent State.
Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1989) analyse a similar context of un-coordination
of investment across sectors. In a model of imperfect competition and demand spillover
two equilibria emerge: one allows industrialisation7 and one does not. The three au-
thors argue that coordination failure and multiple equilibria imply the possibility of
remaining trapped in a Pareto-dominated status.
An investigation has emerged in the literature (Carlsson and van Damme (1993a);
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993)) as far as multiple equilibria in the presence of
coordination failure/strategic complementarities are concerned. Di®erent ideas have
been proposed within the literature on equilibrium selection (Cooper (1999)) where
there is a trade-o® between Risk dominance and Pareto dominance.
The Harsanyi-Selten criterium of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)),
for example, has been a useful tool when dealing with multiple equilibria. An equilib-
rium Risk-Dominates another if it is associated with the largest product of deviations
losses, viz it implies a higher joint loss in the counterfactual case in which every agent
plays the alternative action. Carlsson and van Damme (1993a), Carlsson and van
Damme (1993b) have started to move from this equilibrium selection investigation to-
wards the study of a game theoretical framework with incomplete information, the so
called global game theory. They model a coordination game where the hypothesis of
full information is removed and each player observes the fundamentals of the game
with a noise. The unique equilibrium solution could be a \natural" outcome of this
game.
Morris and Shin (1998) apply the global game tool in a context of currency attack.
In the presence of complete information (all the agents have a correct knowledge of
6Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) refers to a speci¯c historical example: light, medium and heavy indus-
tries development in the World War II period.
7They have a case for a unique equilibrium when pecuniary externalities are manifested through
pro¯ts only, therefore unpro¯table investments have the e®ect of reducing the size of other sectors. In
their model, this kind of externalities can conduce to a unique equilibrium.
4the strength of the economy), the decision to \attack" the rule of law system can be
driven by self-ful¯lling expectations, leading either to a good or to a bad equilibrium.
However, if the hypothesis of incomplete knowledge of the economy's fundamentals is
introduced, the traditional multiple equilibria result is discarded.
This methodology is applied to a Rule of Law stylised model. This allows for ten-
tative and preliminary policy considerations, which can prove to be much more di±cult
exercise for multiple equilibria models investigated in the literature. In fact, Fevrier
and Linnemer (2006) have recently pointed out how in very simple games Pareto and
Risk Dominance (PD, RD) could lead to di®erent directions in the equilibrium selec-
tion. Furthermore, Cooper (1999) and Ho® (2000) have emphasised how coordination
failure is not a rare phenomenon, i.e. many economic problems could be analysed
within this theoretical framework. The Rule of Law context is one of these. The next
section will investigate this aspect.
2.2 The Rule of Law
Di®erent social disciplines have studied the (im-)possibility of enforcing the rule of
law, particularly in countries experiencing important institutional changes, such as
transition or developing countries.
North and Weingast (1989) -in the political science/economic history literature-
have enlightened the coordination problem occurrence in a precise historical context,
the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England, which entailed a delicate relationship be-
tween State and civic society. Citizens did not \trust" the state's action and became
protagonist of the institutional change.
In a subsequent paper, Weingast (1997) models a framework of a coordination
game as a self-interested sovereign State deciding in favour of the Rule of Law (or oppos-
ing it) against two groups of citizens. The Pareto optimal equilibrium (no transgression
and the acquiescence of both groups) is not always reached due to coordination failure.
The acquiescing group faces a high cost in case of a challenge by the other group (the
risk of being the only acquiescent is not worth taking). The forward looking State ex-
pects both groups to challenge its decision and maximises its payo®s by transgressing,
instead of implementing the Rule of Law.
In the law and economics literature Cooter (1996) assesses the strong di®erences
between rule of law State and rule of State law. The former is considered a good
equilibrium entailing the enforcement of property rights, widespread respect of the law
and low level of corruption. The latter is a bad equilibrium with the exact opposite
outcomes, namely anarchy. Economies can show a tendency to move to one or the other
equilibrium, depending on the embedded social norms characterizing the underlying
5society. Agents are not always able to coordinate among themselves because they do
not trust each other (the citizens promoting the Rule of Law could be worse o® than
the ones opposing it).
Finally, the literature analyse the same problem in both a static and a dynamic
environment (Roland and Verdier (2003); Ho® and Stiglitz (2003); Ho® and Stiglitz
(2004a); Ho® and Stiglitz (2004b)) from a political economy perspective. In models
of this kind strategic complementarities imply the existence of multiple equilibria for
agents (e.g. managers of big ¯rms) who have to choose whether to strip assets (be
predators) or to build value (acquiesce).
Economic models with multiple equilibria do not allow for clear policy recom-
mendations. There is no speci¯c indication of which equilibrium is selected because
this depends on exogenous parameters as well as on the subjective perceptions of the
parameters by agents. The Rule of Law models so far mentioned show the following
weakness: they need an exogenous element to qualify the outcome in terms of equi-
librium. In other words, they need to resort to forces outside the model to select the
equilibrium.
This paper will build on the framework studied by Ho® and Stiglitz (2004a) and
aims to broadly extend their results. It starts from the two major concepts of Coordi-
nation Failure and Rule of Law and it attempts to move a step forward by modeling a
stylised economy in which a unique equilibrium emerges despite coordination problems
faced by the players. However, with incomplete information and sequential play agents
are uncertain about other agents' actions and this leads to a good or a bad equilibrium,
depending on the economic conditions and the institutional underpinnings. Under par-
ticular circumstances, there might be a reduced probability for the good equilibrium
to be established in spite of the high values of the fundamentals and the underlying
positive conditions of the economy. The analysis is based on the global game frame-
work applied to multiple equilibria models8. In a context of good fundamentals, the
policy implication would be to require the government to intervene to decrease uncer-
tainty and, at the same time, to convey the \right" positive signals to the economy.
Conversely, in a context of bad fundamentals, the sole reduction of uncertainty would
not be su±cient. This paper will explore the di®erent policy implications ensuing from
the above propositions.
8The global game result, namely the uniqueness of the equilibrium, has been recently challenged by
di®erent scholars. The introduction of endogenous information aggregation (Angeletos and Werning
(2004)) or price formation (Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinki (2004)) allows for multiple equilibria in
currency crises models.
62.3 State Failure vs Market Failure
In the heterogenous context of transition economies, Russia still appears to have some
features of a purely state-controlled economy, despite the fact that it has been strug-
gling to reinforce stronger market institutions and property protection laws since the
beginning of the 90s. There are many concerns about the ability (or willingness) on
the part of the government to move in the \right" direction and to avoid stepping back
on reforms. The literature is still looking for explanations.
On the theoretical ground, Dixit (2004) points out important market failures,
even under \ideal" well functioning state law: \imperfect information, externalities and
imperfect competition are well-recognised causes of market failures, and they can exist
regardless of whether a government adequately protects property rights and enforces
contracts.". On the other hand, lawlessness may emerge in relative advanced market
economies.
On the empirical side, an investigation conducted by the EBRD (Transition Re-
port (2005)) discovered interesting results, and points towards several \institutional"
directions. According to the data collected by the Business Environment and En-
terprises Performance Surveys in 1999, 2002 and 2005 in 27 transition countries, the
following stylised phenomena emerge: on the one hand senior managers are spend-
ing less time dealing with public o±cials (reduction of the so called time-tax), and
the bribe tax (share of annual revenues spent on bribes) dropped in almost all coun-
tries. On the other hand, new private ¯rms pay more than privatised and state ¯rms in
bribes, whereas showing higher growth in e±ciency. In particular, \studies have clearly
demonstrated that corruption tend to have a negative impact on the performance of
a given economy. However, this need not rule out individual ¯rms gaining from cor-
ruption. The fact that corruption can help boost sales for individual ¯rms should be
a matter of concern for policy makers. [...] In fact, governments have continued to
extract resources from ¯rms, [...] public o±cial are preying on the more successful
¯rms".
The paper aims to build a simple representation of the set of puzzling stylised facts
just sketched. In an economy with imperfect information, externalities and imperfect
competition, i.e. rent-seeking possibility by single ¯rm-agent (Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1993); Sonin (2003)) there is an individual incentive to break the Rule of Law
(i.e. paying bribes and avoiding taxes) for agents, while the State is not necessarily
gaining from the law enforcement. The market mechanism fails and therefore the
\Payo® Dominant" equilibrium is reached only if institutions are strong. This creates
a direct relationship between the Rule of Law implementation and the institutional
strength of an economy. This is the focus of the next section.
73 The Model
In coordination games, externalities are not internalised by individual agents. Actions
of players are strategic complements, i.e. increased activity of some players a®ects the
payo®s structure of other players, who will be better o® by increasing their own activity
(Cooper (1999)). This may lead to multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria: self-ful¯lling
expectations (optimistic or pessimist believes) could determine the games' outcome.
This theoretical framework has wide applications in currency attacks (Obstfeld (1996);
Morris and Shin (1998)), bank runs, liquidity black hole (Postlewaite and Vives (1987);
Morris and Shin (2004); Angeletos and Werning (2004)), as well as debt crises, ¯nancial
crashes, riots and political regime changes9.
A traditional coordination game is played in a perfect information setting where
every agent knows the other agents' payo®s and the so called common knowledge
hypothesis is valid. However, the lack (or the partial violation) of such a hypothesis does
characterise many social interaction or economic behavior contexts. In the following
sections I will present a model in which this is the case: an idiosyncratic perception
of a noisy signal of the fundamentals by each and every agent determines a blurred
perception of other agents' action. This allows for the heterogeneity in perception
about the economy's fundamentals and, as a direct consequence, about other players'
actions. This leads to a lower probability of reaching a Pareto-Optimal equilibrium,
and -eventually- allows for the \success" of the coordination failure. The model will
be solved in an imperfect information sequential game framework.
3.1 Strategies
In a stylised economy a continuum10 of agents plays against the State, the ultimate
owner of the monopoly of public order11.
I de¯ne µ as an exogenous stochastic variable representing the \institutional
health" of the economy (the fundamentals), that is assumed uniformly distributed
on the [0,1] interval. A proxy of this variable could be the progress in transition12 or
the degree of social norms compatible with the establishment of the Rule of Law as
pointed out by Cooter (1996). Neither the agent's nor the government's actions have
any e®ect on the fundamentals determined once and for all by nature13. High µ is
attached to strong `advanced' economies, while low µ characterises a weak economy.
9For a summary of the main application of the global games see Angeletos and Werning (2004).
10The population size is one.
11As in Ho® and Stiglitz (2004a).
12E.g. EBRD Transition Indicators, Transition Report (2005).
13In a repeated game context this hypothesis could be relaxed in order to analyse a dynamic model.
8Agents attempt an appropriation of the economy's assets against State's action
and the latter decides to oppose their action or not. A taxonomy of State's and agents'
actions follows.
² State The State decides whether to fully enforce the Rule of Law, i.e. protecting
economy's assets valued °14, or to abandon the economy to anarchy15;
² Agents Either they attempt to appropriate the assets valued °, breaking the
Rule of Law, or they conform to property rights16.
Therefore, Government and agents compete for the same assets, playing one
against the others. In the case of both competing, the former \takes all". This is a
way to model the aforementioned monopoly of public order. However, the situation of
direct ¯ght (government enforcing and agents appropriating) leaves the economy with
a Pareto-sub-Optimal outcome17. Agents might not have interest in the Rule of Law.
This is true despite the fact that a common conforming attitude to the Rule of Law
respect would potentially make everyone better o®, both in terms of overall welfare
and personal payo®s.
3.2 The Enforcing & Appropriation Technology
I call ® 2 [0;1] the percentage of agents appropriating. The payo®s of Government and
agents are mutually a®ected. The former gains in two cases: the economy is strong
(high µ); and the number of appropriating agents is low (small ®). In other words,
it is easier to enforce the Rule of Law in an institutionally strong economy in which
few appropriate. Agents face the opposite situation. Their gain is in proportion to the
prevailing behavior of the other agents (high ®) and in proportion to the weakness of
the economy (low µ).
The government faces a cost in enforcing, while the agents face a cost in appro-
priating. Two cases are explained in order.
14The rule of law value in the economy does not depend on the fundamentals. A possible extension
is when ° depends on the past µ in a dynamic repeated game °t(µt¡1).
15I refer to the anarchy concept as in Ho® and Stiglitz (2003), Ho® and Stiglitz (2004a) and Ho®
and Stiglitz (2004b). In a broader sense I could use the concept of social embeddedness or informal
institutions analysed in Williamson (2000).
16Using the wording of the papers reviewed in the literature review (section 2) I could use an
alternative terminology: to become a robber vs producer, to strip assets vs build value and to challenge
vs acquiesce.
17\The winner takes it all" hypothesis puts this game in di®erent type of context with respect to
the \Invest, share" models described by Dixit (2004). However, this paper will characterise special
cases of one-sided prisoner dilemma, sequential game, and two sided prisoner dilemma in the next
sections.
9² In an economy where the fundamentals µ are ¯xed by nature, the higher the
number of appropriators, the higher the enforcing cost for the government and
the lower the appropriation cost of the players. This is the appropriation spillover
e®ect, negative between State and agents and positive among agents18. Strategic
interactions among players have been modelled by Cooter (1996) and Roland and
Verdier (2003) in a similar theoretical investigation;
² Consider now a ¯xed percentage of appropriators ®: the stronger the funda-
mentals, the lower the government enforcing cost and the higher the players
appropriation cost.
It is now possible to compute government's and agents' payo®s as the di®erence
between the value and the cost of their actions (given the actions of all others players).
I will review case by case and summarise payo®s in table 1.
² State enforcing The value of the property rights protected under the Rule of
Law (assets' value) is °. In the case in which the government enforces the Rule of
Law, it pays a cost divided in two components: k is the sunk cost19, and c(®;µ)
is the variable cost, knowing that ® is the proportion of stripping agents and µ is
the strength of the economy. The overall cost is increasing in k, ® and decreasing
in µ, @c
@® > 0; @c
@µ < 0. If the government enforces the property rights, its payo®s
is the assets' value minus the cost of the enforcement action, ° ¡ [k + c(®;µ)];
² State not enforcing It does not protect any asset and does not pay any cost.
Its payo®s is 0 and anarchy prevails;
² agents appropriating The agents pay a cost, as well, divided in two compo-
nents: a ¯x transaction cost t20; a variable cost increasing in µ and decreasing
in ®. In other words, they pay t and gain c(®;µ) (the opposite of government
variable costs) 21. They are rewarded di®erently accordingly to the State action:
18However, the direct spillover e®ect among agents is not necessary to obtain the coordination
failure result in Morris and Shin (1998). On the contrary, in this model that e®ect does a®ect the
welfare and the ranking of the equilibria. This will be crucial in terms of policy implications.
19I call it sunk cost because its e®ect is independent from agents' action.
20Think of a state with an e®ective police force. However, I am not introducing any hypothesis on
the ¯nancing process of public order enforcement.
21Notice that the hypothesis that the agents' variable costs are equal in value and opposite in sign
with respect to the government's variable costs is a simpli¯cation taken for convenience. Any other
couple of costs functions with the above characteristics, increasing in ® and decreasing in µ for the
government and viceversa for the agents would lead to the same conclusions. For an interpretation
see Appendix 5.
10{ State enforcing the value of appropriating is 0, the reason being that the
State neutralises their action and \take possession" of °: the payo®s of
appropriating is 0 ¡ [t ¡ c(®;µ)] = c(®;µ) ¡ t;
{ State not enforcing the value of appropriating is ° and private agents
indeed appropriate all the assets: the payo®s is ° ¡ [t ¡ c(®;µ)]22.
² agents not appropriating They get 0, having no gain and no costs.
12 Rule of Law not Rule of Law
Not App. 0;° ¡ [k + c(®;µ)] 0;0
App. ¡[t ¡ c(®;µ)];° ¡ [k + c(®;µ)] ° ¡ [t ¡ c(®;µ)];0
Table 1: Payo®s Matrix: (1) Agent(s) & (2) State
3.3 Characterising the Parameter Space
3.3.1 Dominated Strategies
Hitherto I have assumed a generic monotonic variable cost function c(®;µ), in order to
keep the analysis as general as possible. Introducing a linear function, both monotonic
and continuous, I satisfy the conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium and I
simplify the analysis. The following exercise is therefore a subcase23 of Morris and Shin
(1998), i.e. they derive and prove the result for a generic monotonic and continuous
c(®;µ).
However, the model presented in this paper has a major element of di®erence in
respect to Morris and Shin (1998). The agents' cost of appropriating is endogenously
determined by the number of appropriators, in line with Cooter (1996) and Roland
and Verdier (2003) models of Rule of Law. There is a \positive" externality in case of
many agents appropriating. The policy implications are indeed a®ected by this new
feature of the model.
I assume that c(®;µ) = ® ¡ µ. This is the simplest linear function increasing in
the proportion of appropriators ® and decreasing in the strength of the economy µ.
22The hypothesis underneath table 1 is that each agent i appropriates a tiny fraction of the whole
°, i.e. °(1 ¡ ½i), being the population a continuum of size 1. In case all agents appropriated, the
entire ° would be completely depleted-stolen,
P
i2A °(1 ¡ ½i) = °. However, this is just a scale e®ect
that is not a®ecting any result of the model in both the equilibrium solution and the welfare analysis.
23Any non linear but monotonic and continuous function would guarantee the same result, but the
computations would be cumbersome.
11Strictly dominated strategies emerge for particular parameters' values. In other
words, there is a set of parameters conducing to dominant strategies.
² µ = 0, i.e. worst fundamentals: if state's payo®s ° ¡ k ¡ c(®;0) < 0 8® )
° ¡k¡c(0;0) < 0 ) k > °. When the economy has the minimum \institutional
strength" (µ = 0), the number of appropriating agents is irrelevant. Even with
® = 0, the cost for the government is higher than the value of the Rule of Law;
² ® = 1, i.e. all appropriating: if state's payo®s ° ¡ k ¡ c(1;µ) < 0 8µ )
° ¡ k ¡ c(1;1) < 0 ) k > °. In the case in which all agents appropriate, the
government has a negative payo®s despite the fact that the fundamentals could
be the best (µ = 1);
² µ = 1, i.e. best fundamentals: if agent's payo®s ° ¡ t + c(®;1) < 0 8® )
° +c(1;1)¡t < 0 ) t > °. When the economy has the maximum \institutional
strength" (µ = 1), no matter how many agents decide to appropriate (even ® = 1),
the transaction cost will always overcome the gain.
3.3.2 Tripartite Space
Following Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998) I can divide the fundamentals'
µ space in three intervals:
² hell [0;µ], [®;1]. I derive the conditions under which anarchy is the dominant
strategy for the State: a) k + c(®;µ) > ° 8® ) µ = k ¡ ° > 0j® = 0. Below
µ not to enforce is a dominant strategy for the government; b) k + c(®;µ) >
° 8µ ) ® = °+1¡k > 0jµ = 1. Above ® not to enforce is a dominant strategy
for the government.
² heaven [µ;1], [0;®]. I derive the conditions under which not appropriation is a
dominant strategy for the agents: a) ° ¡t+c(®;µ) < 0 8® ) µ = ° +1¡tj® =
0. Above µ agents have no incentive to appropriate, their costs outweigh their
bene¯ts, then not to appropriate is a dominant strategy; b) ° ¡ t + c(®;µ) <
0 8µ ) ® = t¡°jµ = 0. Below ® agents have no incentive to appropriate. Their
costs outweigh their bene¯ts, then not to appropriate is a dominant strategy;
² no corner solutions' area [µ;µ] [®;®]. This is the interval within which not
trivial solutions appear and a multiplicity of equilibria emerge.
12Figure 1: State Payo®s: ° ¡ [k + c(®;µ)]
13Figure 2: Agents Payo®s: ° ¡ [t ¡ c(®;µ)]
14Non strictly dominant strategies emerge if
µ 2 [maxf0;k ¡ °g;minf1;° + 1 ¡ tg] (1)
® 2 [maxf0;t ¡ °g;minf1;° + 1 ¡ kg] (2)
In fact, outside these thresholds there are strictly dominant strategies and cor-
ners solutions appear24. The equilibrium analysis follows and investigates the internal
solutions of the game, supposing that equations (1) and (2) are both satis¯ed25.
3.4 The Single Agent Game without Uncertainty
I suppose that a unique agent plays against the State, i.e. the coordination failure
among agents vanishes, while the coordination failure between the single agent and the
State remains in place. For what concerns the model this means that ® 2 f0;1g and
no longer ® 2 [0;1]. This is simply a corner case in which all agents appropriate or
not. The population has size one and the payo®s matrix in table 1 is consistent.
The outcome will indeed be di®erent according to the time structure, either simul-
taneous or sequential, of the \collapsed" two players' game with perfect information.
At this stage there is no role for uncertainty. µ is predetermined and perfectly known
by everybody.
3.4.1 Simultaneous Game
Let me suppose that the government and the agent play simultaneously in period 1 as
described in ¯gure 3.







Figure 3: Timing: Simultaneous Play
Proposition 1 In a simultaneous game with no uncertainty about the fundamentals
and no coordination failure among agents (i.e. one agent, static game with perfect
information) there are two Nash Equilibria. One in which the government leaves
24Additional implicit conditions are k¡° · 1;t¡° · 1;°+1¡t · 1;°+1¡k · 1, i.e. ° · k · °+1
and ° · t · ° + 1 as shown in ¯gure 1 and 2.
25See Appendices 5 and 6 for an interpretation.
15the economy to anarchy and the agent appropriates, and another in which the Rule of
Law is enforced when the agent does not appropriate.
Proof 1 See Appendix 7.
The multiplicity of equilibria is generated by the coordination failure between the
government and the single agent due to the negative e®ect of the agent's decision on
the cost of the government, namely the negative externality.
3.4.2 Sequential Game
Now consider a sequential setting as depicted in ¯gure 4, the government plays in
period 2.







Figure 4: Timing: Sequential Play
Proposition 2 In a sequential game with no uncertainty about the fundamentals and
no coordination failure among agents (i.e. one agent, dynamic game with perfect in-
formation) there is one Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium where agents ap-
propriate and the Rule of Law is not enforced.
Proof 2 See Appendix 8.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium is generated by the sequential structure of the
game. The agent, exploiting the ¯rst mover's advantage, will appropriate leading the
economy to a Pareto-dominated Sub-Game Perfect Nash equilibrium.
This second proposition could describe Russia at the very beginning of transition.
The oligarchy was fully in control of the economy's assets (no uncertainty) and pursued
a common strong interest (no coordination failure) of \appropriation". It was a static
and stable situation. There was no real hope for the State (in its broad de¯nition as
a civic and judiciary society) to enforce property rights. This is the period of massive
stripping of assets, privatisation in favour of few big businessman or politicians, and
when contract enforcement was very di±cult, at best.
163.5 The Multiple Agents Game with Uncertainty
I now remove the unrealistic hypotheses of a unique agent and perfect information to
take on board market failure (Dixit (2004)). Multiple agents now receive an imperfect
information about the fundamentals from the Nature, as in Morris and Shin (1998):
xi = µ + "i (xi » Uniform on [µ ¡ ";µ + "] with " > 026).
3.5.1 Simultaneous Game
I ¯rst consider the simultaneous game, as shown in ¯gure 5. The result of proposition
1 is replicated.
[xi = µ + "i] //// [® 2 [0;1]] [RL vs not ¡ RL]
Nature
OO




Figure 5: Timing: Simultaneous Play and Uncertainty
Proposition 3 In a simultaneous game with uncertainty about the fundamentals and
coordination failure among agents (static game with imperfect information) there are
two Bayes-Nash Equilibria.
Proof 3 The proof of this proposition is based on the following argument: agents will
act according to the believes of other agents' actions, thus generating a self-ful¯lling
expectation27. If they expect the State to enforce the Rule of Law, they will not appro-
priate, but if their perception of the economic environment is such that there will be no
enforcement, then they will appropriate. The decision is led by the overall \perceived"
environment, and this mechanism generates the self-ful¯lling result. Both equilibria
could be reached because there is no possibility of assessing how believes will be formed28.
3.5.2 Sequential Game
Suppose now that the sequence of the game is the following: each and every agent
receives an imperfect information about the fundamentals and the government plays
26It is also needed that " is bounded, see Morris and Shin (1998) note 4 page 590.
27For a similar argument see Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998).
28In the intermediate case of a simultaneous game with many agents and no uncertainty there are
still two Nash-Equilibria. Every agent has to guess ® despite knowing µ. She is aware that the
State will chose anarchy only if ® > ° ¡ k + µ. There is no mechanism leading to strictly dominant
strategies, neither for agents nor for the State.
17only after having observed ® and µ29 as ¯gure 6 characterises30.
[xi = µ + "i] //// [® 2 [0;1]] //// [RL vs not ¡ RL]
Nature
OO




Figure 6: Timing: Sequential Play and Uncertainty
The signal x is uniformly drawn on the interval [µ ¡ ";µ + "] with " > 0. Using
backward induction, agents are conscious that the decision of the State is simply based
on the observed ® and µ. However ®("i) depends on "i, which is a random variable.
The agents decision is taken only through the E(®), i.e. the expected value of the
number of appropriators. It will turn out that this new feature of the model, under
the non implausible conditions derived in section 3.3.2, leads to a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In a sequential game with uncertainty about the fundamentals and co-
ordination failure among agents (dynamic game with imperfect information) there is




"[3° ¡ 2(k + t)]




"[1 + 2(k ¡ °)] + °(1 + k ¡ °) ¡ t + 1
2
° + 2" + 1
(4)
The Rule of Law is enforced if the value of µ selected by nature is greater than µ¤.
Otherwise anarchy prevails.
Proof 4 Follows in Sections 3.5.3, 3.5.4, 3.5.5 and 3.5.6.
3.5.3 Period 2: Government
The sequential model is solved by backward induction. I start looking at State's ac-
tion. The Government has the advantage of playing without uncertainty, because µ is
revealed in period 2. At the same time it has the disadvantage of moving only in period
29There is no uncertainty on the parameter of the game for the government, which although moves
after the agents.
30In a di®erent context, regulatory barriers and entry models, Bennet and Estrin (2006) use a
similar sequential game approach where the pro¯tability of a new sector becomes common knowledge
only in a second period.
31Also called Weakly Sequential Equilibrium.
182, passively facing agents' actions taken in period 1. Therefore, the decision rule of the
government is extremely simple, namely to implement the Rule of Law if a su±ciently
low number of agents appropriate, and viceversa if many of them appropriate32.
° ¡ k ¡ c(®;µ) ¸ 0 ) RL (5)
° ¡ k ¡ c(®;µ) < 0 ) not ¡ RL (6)
The proportion of appropriators ® whose actions are su±cient to induce the
abandonment of the Rule of Law by the State33, with c(®;µ) = ® ¡ µ is:
®(k;µ;°)
(
0 if 0 · µ < k ¡ °
° ¡ k + µ if k ¡ ° · µ · 1
The function ®(k;µ;°) is increasing in µ (the higher the institutional strength,
the easier the implementation of the Rule of Law) and ° (the higher the value of the
Rule of Law, the higher the e®ort in defending). The function is negatively a®ected by
the sunk cost k.
The State decides by observing the proportion of appropriators in the economy
and by comparing it with ®(k;µ;°), the maximum number of appropriator before
anarchy prevails. The stronger the economy, the fewer the appropriators and the
higher the likelihood of Rule of Law enforcement. Viceversa, the weaker the economy
the higher the number of appropriators and the lower the likelihood of Rule of Law
enforcement.
3.5.4 Period 1: Agents




1 if xi < x¤ ) Appropriate
0 if xi ¸ x¤ ) Not ¡ Appropriate
Any agent receives a noisy signal about the fundamentals and she appropriates
or not according to a simple threshold rule: strong signal, above x¤ ) not appropriate;
32This passive role of the state in Rule of Law modelling has been challenged. For a di®erent way
of dealing with the role of the government see Katz and Owen (2004).
33The attribution of the equal sign to the RL or not-RL is irrelevant. The probability that ° ¡[k +
c(®;µ)] = 0 is zero.
34It turns out that this is the \optimal" strategy, see Morris and Shin (1998).
19weak signal, below x¤ ) appropriate. The number of agents who will actually appro-
priate (call it S(:;:)) depends on the distribution of the signal, xi » [µ ¡ ";µ + "] and
on the fundamentals µ. I distinguish three cases:
² x¤ > µ +" ) µ < x¤ ¡", the fundamental is lower than the minimum signal any
agent can see and everyone appropriates;
² x¤ < µ ¡ " ) µ > x¤ + ", the fundamental is higher than the maximum signal
any agent can see and non-appropriation prevails;
² x¤ 2 [µ ¡ ";µ + "] the appropriation choice derives from the expected value of ®,































1 if x¤ > µ + " µ < x¤ ¡ "
1
2 ¡ 1
2"(µ ¡ x¤) if x¤ 2 [µ ¡ ";µ + "] µ 2 [x¤ ¡ ";x¤ + "]
0 if x¤ < µ ¡ " µ > x¤ + "
3.5.5 The Equilibrium and the State
The two functions ®(k;µ;°) (increasing in µ) and S(µ;Ix¤(xi)) (decreasing in µ) cross
at the equilibrium point µ¤:













¤ + "[1 + 2(k ¡ °)]g (8)
(
µ > µ¤ ) ®(k;µ;°) > S(µ;Ix¤(xi)) RL
µ < µ¤ ) ®(k;µ;°) < S(µ;Ix¤(xi)) Not ¡ RL
The Government defends property rights and the Rule of Law is established if the
proportion of agents appropriating is lower then the maximum bearable percentage.
The opposite happens if the inequality is reversed and anarchy prevails35. See ¯gure 7.
35If the µ¤ was implicitly derived through ®(k;µ;°) = S(µ;Ix¤(x)), then it could be shown that
0 < @µ
¤
@x¤ < 1: any increase in the agents' threshold rule positively a®ects (less then proportionally) the













T < T* Anarchy  T > T* Rule of Law 
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Figure 7: Equilibrium: µ¤
213.5.6 The Equilibrium and the Agents
I now turn to the analysis of the agent's uncertain payo®s. I start from the payo®s in
case of appropriation, which depends on the subsequent action of the State as regards




c(®;µ) ¡ t ;µ > µ¤ ;®(µ) > S(µ;Ix¤(x)) RL
° + c(®;µ) ¡ t ;µ < µ¤ ;®(µ) < S(µ;Ix¤(x)) Anarchy
h(µ;x¤) represents the realised payo®s in case of common knowledge (no uncer-
tainty). However, I know that only the government chooses when µ is revealed (see
section (3.5.3)) in period 2. On the contrary, agents observe an idiosyncratic noisy sig-
nal, taking their appropriation decision on the basis of Eifh(µ;x¤)jxig = u(xi;x¤) 7 0.
Solving for the expected value of the indi®erent agent I will show that x¤ is indeed
unique and that the strategy summarised by the indicator function Ix¤(x) is the opti-
mal strategy.
Every agent is identical and knows that the other agents face exactly the same
problem, therefore a generic agent (I dropped the subscript i for simplicity) will com-
pute the following expected value, knowing that the signals are distributed around
























[c(®;µ) ¡ t]dµ + °(µ
¤ ¡ x + ")
¸
The indi®erent agent is the one observing exactly x¤ (this agent exists due to the
uniform distribution hypothesis of the noisy signals) and she does not gain nor lose

























"[3° ¡ 2(k + t)]




"[1 + 2(k ¡ °)] + °(1 + k ¡ °) ¡ t + 1
2
° + 2" + 1
:¥ (12)
End of the proof.
For " ! 0 ) x¤ = µ¤, the case in which agents observe perfectly µ and therefore
choose according to the known µ. The function describing the share of agents attacking
would become a step function S(µ¤;Ix¤(µ)).
S(µ;Ix¤(µ))
(
1 if x¤ = µ¤ > µ
0 if x¤ = µ¤ < µ
Therefore:
Lemma 1 In a sequential game with no uncertainty about the fundamentals and coor-









The Rule of Law is enforced if the value of µ selected by nature is greater than µ¤,
otherwise anarchy prevails36.
3.6 Comparative Statics
The advantage of obtaining a closed form solution for the equilibrium is that I am able
to compute the derivative of the threshold for the signal (x¤) and the threshold for the
fundamentals (µ¤) with respect to " (the degree of uncertainty), ° (the value of the
Rule of Law for the State), k (the sunk cost of the government) and t (the transaction
cost of appropriating). It turns out that
36Note that proposition 2, i.e. no uncertainty and no inter-agents coordination failure, implies
the uniqueness of the equilibrium, namely anarchy (regardless of institutions). On the other hand,
according to lemma 1 in a sequential game with inter-agents coordination failure the strength of
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° + 2" + 1
< 0
where the inequalities' signs are determined by exploiting the conditions k > °,
t > ° and the fact that the sunk cost and transaction cost are not too high, i.e. bounded
from above37.
In case of uncertainty there is a social loss. There are more agents whose signals
is far away from the true fundamentals and this determines a higher proportion of ap-
propriators38. The economy needs higher fundamentals in order to escape the anarchy
trap.
On the other hand, if the value of the assets/rule of law (°) in the economy is
higher, the e®ect is positive because fewer agents are willing to appropriate (or the
government is more willing to ¯ght) and even a lower fundamental value allows for the
establishment of the Rule of Law. This is an interesting result, because both agents
and the State gain from higher ° and from \¯ghting" (see table 1). Therefore assessing
the e®ect of the variable ° would not be straightforward a priori. In other words, the
overall e®ect is in favour of the State, due to its monopoly of the public order.
An higher sunk cost for the government39 increases the willingness to appropriate
and obviously weakens the government40.
Finally higher transaction cost induces lower appropriation and higher probability
of Rule of Law establishment.
37See footnote 24.
38Notice this is true notwithstanding the decrease of x¤: this e®ect would per se increase the
probability of the Rule of Law enforcement, but it not enough to counteract the simultaneous increase
of ", i.e. the uncertainty area.
39This could be the case of Russia at the end of the 90s. Before and after the 1998 crises, \corruption"
was widespread and rule of law implementation was probably limited.
40In this stylised model the government is always honest and the agents are always \dishonest"
when this is pro¯table. This assumption is not realistic in general terms but it is meant to show the
trade-o® between cultural independence and enforcement of law implied in the model (see also Cooter
(1996)). In this model a \weaker" government is a kind of proxy of \corrupted" or expropriating
State.
243.6.1 Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications
Consider now the sum of the payo®s for the government and the continuum of agents.








Wj + WS (14)
where the superscript T stands for total and the subscripts i, j and S for appropri-
ating agents, not-appropriating agents and State, respectively. Therefore, exploiting
the hypothesis that the population of agents has size 1, the overall welfare for the
economy in case of Rule of Law is:
®[c(®;µ) ¡ t] + (1 ¡ ®) ¤ 0 + ° ¡ k ¡ c(®;µ) =
®
2 ¡ (µ + 1 + t)® + (µ + ° ¡ k))
and in case of anarchy is
®[° + c(®;µ) ¡ t] + (1 ¡ ®) ¤ 0 + 0 =
®
2 + (° ¡ µ ¡ t)®




1+° ) W(RL) > W(not ¡ RL)
® >
°¡k+µ
1+° ) W(RL) < W(not ¡ RL)
This highlights an important trade-o®. On the one hand each agent and the
State prefer the good equilibrium (Rule of law and no appropriation) if t ¡ ° > ® ¡ µ
and k ¡ ° < µ ¡ ® (see table 1). On the other hand, the welfare in the Rule of Law
case is higher for a su±ciently small ® <
°¡k+µ
1+° . However, this is no more true when
the aforementioned threshold is violated. The Payo® dominant equilibrium is now the
\bad" one and welfare is maximised in the anarchy case.
In this model the payo®s dominant equilibrium switches according to ® and this
explains an apparently puzzling result. In economies in which the uncertainty of the
institutional fundamentals is high and hence the expectation of the Rule of Law im-
plementation is low41, both from an individual point of view and from a \collective
41Notice that under very similar hypotheses the \bad" equilibrium risk dominates the \good" one
(see Harsanyi-Selten criterium of risk dominance in section 2.1).
25Figure 8: Welfare in the Rule of Law vs Anarchy
26action" perspective, the anarchy implementation (embedded informal institutions ¶ a la
Williamson (2000)) is the preferred outcome.
This model allows for tentative policy implications in terms of what is needed
to counteract the risk of anarchy, namely many agents appropriating and government
not enforcing property rights (or expropriating). If the fundamentals of the economy
are weak (poor institutions) and the government knows that there is a widespread
\corruption" attitude, there are really few options in order to lead to economy towards
a virtuous path. This is probably the case in countries where institutions change very
slowly (Roland (2001); Roland (2004)) and the economy is not recovering fast enough
from a negative shock (e.g. transition period) or underdevelopment42. The policy
maker should internalise as much as possible the value of the Rule of Law and work
as hard as possible on the reduction of any distorted signals (uncertainty), such as
allowing free media and information °ows (see also a recent paper by Egorov, Guriev
and Sonin (2006)).
The big push argument ¶ a la Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny (1989) in this context
would be justi¯ed by the need to escape from the coordination failure characterizing
the collective action problem.
The best case scenario is less interesting: if good economic results and institu-
tional development are jointly showing up, they simply allow for an easier establishment
of the Rule of Law43.
However, the mixed cases are the more interesting. Russia is probably a good
example, the reason being that the economy is su±ciently developed (thanks, for in-
stance, to revenues from oil, high °) and still unable to enforce domestic investors
compliance with the Rule of Law because of weak cultural consensus on the impor-
tance of cooperation and on property rights respect (low µ). The biggest e®ort should
therefore be put on institutions in broad sense. The government and the civic society
have to seize any chance on the importance of the reciprocal collaboration. This is
because the overall cooperative action guarantees higher payo®s for everybody. Agents
should be more informed on the e®ects of the not-cooperative actions on their own
payo®s. At the same time the government should be more aware of the importance of
the establishment of the Rule of Law44.
Viceversa, if institutions are already in place (high µ) but the economy is not
recovering su±ciently fast (low °), then allowing pro-cyclical policies (like Ho® and
42Think of country like Turkmenistan or Belarus.
43Think of the Visegrad countries, now members of the EU.
44Despite the fact that in the model there is the unrealistic hypothesis that the government is
honest, k is implicitly capturing the degree of state laziness. A corrupted government would be more
lazy (higher sunk costs), a honest one would be the opposite.
27Stiglitz (2004b) suggest) could improve the situation.
Depending on the combination of economic conditions and institutional develop-
ment, the outcome of the coordination failure will be more or less severe.
4 Conclusions
This paper extends the Ho® and Stiglitz (2004a) theoretical investigation on a model of
Rule of Law and exploits the global games approach (Carlsson and van Damme (1993b)
and Morris and Shin (1998)) to solve a coordination game for a unique equilibrium.
I have analysed the role of Coordination Failure in a stylised economy in which
institutions (formal and/or informal) and economic conditions determine whether an-
archy or the Rule of Law prevails. This theoretical investigation starts from the as-
sumption that uncertainty plays a crucial role, as one characterisation of market failure.
A mechanism of imperfect information conveys a noisy signal to agents, whose choice
is based on the expectation of other players' actions. Some agents will appropriate if
they expect that many others will appropriate. Vice-versa, other agents will respect
property rights if they expect that few others will appropriate. However, this game's
outcome is not generated by self-ful¯lling expectations (like in Cooter (1996)). Insti-
tutionally strong countries will always guarantee the enforcement of the Rule of Law,
while institutionally weak countries will be confronted with anarchy.
This theoretical framework solves the model for a unique equilibrium and this
is crucial for policy implications. On the one hand, this model predicts that high
uncertainty and sunk costs of law enforcement have a negative e®ect, pushing the
economy towards a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. On the other hand, the high value
given to the economy's assets (embedded social norms) has a positive in°uence, leading
to a Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
The stylised framework of this paper appears to o®er a su±ciently realistic rep-
resentation of the period of uncertainty and poor institutional performance transition
countries and low/middle income countries are passing through, i.e. this simple stylised
economy can describe countries in which property rights' protection is low, despite be-
ing in a relative advanced stage of transition and in good economic conditions. This
riddle has not yet been fully explained by the existing literature.
285 Appendix: The Cost Function
The linear cost function c(®;µ) = ® ¡ µ has a simple interpretation. The government
bene¯ts whenever the fundamentals are \higher" than the number of appropriators
(® < µ), given that the population size is normalised to 1. Viceversa, each agent
bene¯ts whenever the opposite happens (® > µ). Think of ® as the total number of
appropriators out of a pool of µ potentially honest agents, as if the economy showed
a natural level of dishonest people 1 ¡ µ. If all the potentially honest people were
appropriating (® > µ), then the government would be paying a cost to enforce, while
the agents would bene¯t by widespread dishonesty. By the same token, if ® < µ, then
the government is in a stronger position and agents lose from appropriating.
6 Appendix: Sunk and Transaction Costs
In the text I derived the condition k > ° and t > ° for the determination of domi-
nant/dominated strategies. An interpretation is the following: in an economy where
the enforcement depends only on the variable part c(®;µ);k = 0, the government will
take a chance to enforce, despite the fact that the economy is extremely weak. A pos-
sibility that I want to rule out when k > ° (there will always be a Hell). Conversely, I
have a condition t > ° on the agents, who are no more attracted by the appropriation
option in a strong economy (there will always be a Heaven).
7 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
Representing the game in strategic (or normal) form and substituting for the functional
form c(®;µ) = ®¡µ, I obtain the following payo®s matrix and the two Nash equilibria
emerge if equation (1) and (2) are satis¯ed: (Not-App.; RL), (App.; Not-RL)
12 RL not-RL
Not App. 0;° ¡ k + µ 0;0
App. ¡t + 1 ¡ µ;° ¡ k ¡ 1 + µ ° ¡ t + 1 ¡ µ;0
Table 2: Payo®s Matrix: (1) Agent & (2) State
8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
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Using backward induction, the government will choose to give up the enforcement
of the Rule of Law if the agent appropriates, and viceversa, it will enforce if she does
not. The agent, exploiting the ¯rst mover's advantage, will appropriate and the Sub-
Game Perfect Nash equilibrium (App.; Not-RL) prevails.
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